Ei saatavilla suomeksi
Tuomas Takalo
- 18 June 2013
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 147Details
- Abstract
- Financial integration in some segments of the financial markets started to deteriorate during the recent period of economic turmoil in Europe. This paper examines whether this phenomenon also holds true for the European retail payments market. In comparison with other segments of the financial markets, the integration of the retail payments market has been more difficult to quantify, and the effects of recent developments - including the creation of the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) and the economic crisis - have been hard to evaluate using existing measures of integration. As an indicator of financial integration, convergence in the European retail payments market is measured during the period 1995-2011 for the most used retail payment instruments: cash, debit card, credit card, direct debit, credit transfer, cheque and e-money. Two methods for estimating convergence are used: sigma convergence and beta convergence. There is some evidence of convergence for all payment instruments, except for cheques and e-money. The results suggest that the cross-country dispersion of the use of payment instruments has declined over time in Europe. The pace of convergence has picked up since the introduction of the single currency. There is also some evidence of beta convergence. In contrast to some other segments of the financial markets, integration in the retail payments market has not deteriorated during the financial crisis.
- JEL Code
- F36 : International Economics→International Finance→Financial Aspects of Economic Integration
G20 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→General
- 7 November 2004
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 406Details
- Abstract
- It is commonly thought that an open economy can accommodate output shocks through either exchange rate or real sector adjustments. We formalise this notion by incorporating labour market rigidities into an “escape clause” model of currency crises. We show that the absence of structural reform makes a currency peg more fragile and undermines the credibility of the monetary authority in a dynamic setting. The fragility is captured by a devaluation premium in expectations that increases the average inflation rate when the currency peg is more vulnerable to “busts” than “booms”. This interaction between macroeconomic and microeconomic rigidities suggests that a policy reform can only be consistent if it renders either exchange rates or labour markets flexible.
- JEL Code
- E42 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Monetary Systems, Standards, Regimes, Government and the Monetary System, Payment Systems
F33 : International Economics→International Finance→International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
D84 : Microeconomics→Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty→Expectations, Speculations
- 1 October 2000
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 34Details
- Abstract
- Focusing on emerging market currency arrangements, we build a model of an exchange rate peg with escape clauses and output persistence. We first show how output persistence works as an additional 'fundamental' so that an exogenous increase in persistence can make the currency peg more vulnerable to speculative attacks. We then endogenise output persistence as arising from capital market frictions that are caused by weak corporate governance institutions. It turns out that in emerging market economies, often characterised by credit constraints, a partial reform of corporate governance institutions may enhance a financial accelerator mechanism, which increases output persistence and deteriorates the credibility of the exchange rate peg. A conservative policymaker partially counters this adverse effect, but only a complete reform of corporate governance institutions fully eliminates persistence and reduces the risk of currency crisis on all levels of policy preferences.
- JEL Code
- E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
F33 : International Economics→International Finance→International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
D84 : Microeconomics→Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty→Expectations, Speculations
G18 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Government Policy and Regulation
G38 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Government Policy and Regulation