Stefan Gebauer
Monetary Policy
- Division
Monetary Policy Strategy
- Current Position
-
Senior Economist
- Fields of interest
-
Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics,Financial Economics,International Economics
- Education
- 2014-2020
PhD in Economics, Free University, Berlin, Germany
- 2012-2014
MSc in International Economics and Economic Policy, Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main, Germany
- 2008-2012
BSc in Economics and Business Administration, Eberhard Karls University, Tuebingen, Germany
- 2010-2011
BSc in Economics, University of Massachusetts, Boston, United States
- Professional experience
- 2020-2022
Economist - Macroeconomic Analysis and Forecasting Division, Directorate General Economics, Statistics and International, Banque de France
- 2016-2020
Research Associate - Forecasting and Economic Policy Department, German Institute for Economic Research (DIW)
- 2015-2016
External Consultant - Country Surveillance Division, Directorate General Economics, European Central Bank
- 2013-2014
Research Assistant - Chair of Finance and Economics (Prof. Roman Inderst), Goethe University
- 2014
Research Intern - Department for Banking and Financial Supervision, Bundesbank
- 2012-2013
Research Assistant - Economics Department, KfW Banking Group
- 1 October 2024
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2985Details
- Abstract
- This paper examines the impact of rising interest rates on central bank profitability. Using a stylized income model, we demonstrate that changes in interest rates in combination with expansive balance sheet policies introduce a cyclical component into the central bank’s profit and loss statement. Ourfindings reveal, however, that while the interplay of such policies may dampen short-term profitability if interest rates rise, they do not undermine a central bank’s financial strength, because higher interest rates also raise the value of future seigniorage income. Using data for the euro area, we quantify the consequences for inflation of setting interest rates aimed at mitigating financial losses, showing that such a strategy would lead to substantially higher inflation rates. Overall, our findings confirm that a central bank’s willingness to accept temporary losses reflects a commitment to price stability, rather than a hindrance.
- JEL Code
- E31 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Price Level, Inflation, Deflation
E43 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
E63 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook→Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy, Stabilization, Treasury Policy
- 31 July 2024
- THE ECB BLOGDetails
- JEL Code
- E50 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→General
E59 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Other
- 13 May 2020
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2406Details
- Abstract
- Macroprudential policies are often aimed at the commercial banking sector, while a host of other non-bank financial institutions, or shadow banks, may not fall under their jurisdiction. We study the effects of tightening commercial bank regulation on the shadow banking sector. We develop a DSGE model that differentiates between regulated, monopolistic competitive commercial banks and a shadow banking system that relies on funding in a perfectly competitive market for investments. After estimating the model using euro area data from 1999 – 2014 including information on shadow banks, we find that tighter capital requirements on commercial banks increase shadow bank lending, which may have adverse financial stability effects. Coordinating macroprudential tightening with monetary easing can limit this leakage mechanism, while still bringing about the desired reduction in aggregate lending. In a counterfactual analysis, we compare how macroprudential policy implemented before the crisis would have dampened the business and lending cycles.
- JEL Code
- E32 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Business Fluctuations, Cycles
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors - Network
- Research Task Force (RTF)
- 12 September 2017
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2101Details
- Abstract
- This paper investigates the link between corporate debt and investment for a group of five peripheral euro area countries. Using firm-level data from 2005-2014, we postulate a non-linear corporate leverage-investment relationship and derive thresholds beyond which leverage has a negative and significant impact on investment. The investment sensitivity of debt increased after 2008 when financial distress intensified and firms had a lower capacity to finance investment from internal sources of funds. Our results also suggest that even moderate levels of debt can exert a negative influence on investment for smaller firms or when profitability is low.
- JEL Code
- E22 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Consumption, Saving, Production, Investment, Labor Markets, and Informal Economy→Capital, Investment, Capacity
F34 : International Economics→International Finance→International Lending and Debt Problems
G31 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Capital Budgeting, Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies, Capacity
G32 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Financing Policy, Financial Risk and Risk Management, Capital and Ownership Structure, Value of Firms, Goodwill
- 2023
- European Economic Review
- 2022
- Banque de France Working Paper Series
- 2022
- Banque de France Eco Notepad
- 2021
- Banque de France Working Paper Series
- 2021
- Banque de France Eco Notepad
- 2020
- DIW Economic Bulletin
- 2020
- DIW Economic Bulletin
- 2020
- DIW Politikberatung Kompakt 158
- 2020
- DIW Aktuell
- 2020
- DIW Discussion Papers
- 2019
- DIW Economic Bulletin
- 2019
- DIW Economic Bulletin
- 2019
- DIW Aktuell
- 2019
- IWH Online
- 2018
- Journal of International Money and Finance
- 2018
- DIW Economic Bulletin
- 2018
- DIW Economic Bulletin
- 2017
- European Parliament Monetary DialogueMonetary policy implications of financial innovation: In-depth analysis
- 2017
- DIW Roundup
- 2017
- DIW Economic Bulletin
- 2017
- DIW Economic Bulletin