Nu este disponibil în limba română
Mila Getmansky Sherman
- 14 November 2023
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2873Details
- Abstract
- Central clearing counterparties (CCPs) were established to mitigate default losses resulting from counterparty risk in derivatives markets. In a parsimonious model, we show that clearing benefits are distributed unevenly across market participants. Loss sharing rules determine who wins or loses from clearing. Current rules disproportionately benefit market participants with flat portfolios. Instead, those with directional portfolios are relatively worse off, consistent with their reluctance to voluntarily use central clearing. Alternative loss sharing rules can address cross-sectional disparities in clearing benefits. However, we show that CCPs may favor current rules to maximize fee income, with externalities on clearing participation.
- JEL Code
- G18 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Government Policy and Regulation
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
G12 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Asset Pricing, Trading Volume, Bond Interest Rates