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Manuel A. Muñoz
Risk Management
- Current Position
-
Senior Lead Financial Risk Expert
- Fields of interest
-
Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics,Financial Economics
- Education
- 2017-2020
PhD in Economics, UCM, UV, UPV and UCLM, Spain
- 2015
Técnico Comercial y Economista del Estado (State Economist and Trade Expert), Cuerpo Superior de Técnicos Comerciales y Economistas del Estado, Spain
- 2012-2013
MSc in Specialized Economic Analysis, Barcelona School of Economics (UPF and UAB), Spain
- 2005-2009
Bachelor and Master 's Degree (Licenciatura) in Economics, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Spain
- Professional experience
- 2020-
Senior Lead Expert - Directorate General Macroprudential Policy and Financial Stability & Directorate Risk Management, European Central Bank
- 2017-2020
Senior Adviser (Financial Affairs) - Minister's Office, Ministry of Economy, Industry and Competitiveness
- 2015-2017
Head of Service - Financial Policy and Regulation Department & Strategic Analysis and International Financial System Department, Spanish Treasury
- 2015
Research Assistant - Monetary Policy Research Division, Directorate General Research, European Central Bank
- Awards
- 2012
"la Caixa" Fellow, la Caixa Fellowship Association
- 29 March 2023
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2801Details
- Abstract
- The bulk of euro-denominated cash is held for store of value purposes, with such holdings sharply increasing in times of high economic uncertainty. We develop a Diamond and Dy-bvig model with public money as a store of value and heterogeneous beliefs about bank stability that accounts for this evidence. Consumers who are sufficiently pessimistic prefer to hold cash. In our model, the introduction of a central bank digital currency (CBDC) as a store of value that is superior to cash leads to bank disintermediation as some depositors opt for switching to CBDC based on their beliefs. While CBDC partially replaces deposits, long-term lending decreases less than proportionally as remaining depositors are, on aver-age, more optimistic about bank stability and banks re-balance their portfolio accordingly. The appropriate calibration of CBDC design features such as remuneration and quantity limits can mitigate these effects. We study the individual and social welfare implications of introducing CBDC as a store of value.
- JEL Code
- E41 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Demand for Money
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G11 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Portfolio Choice, Investment Decisions
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
- 28 July 2022
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2689Details
- Abstract
- We provide evidence on the estimated effects of digital euro news on bank valuations and lending and find that they depend on deposit reliance and design features aimed at calibrating the quantity of CBDC. Then, we develop a quantitative DSGE model that replicates such evidence and incorporates key selected mechanisms through which CBDC issuance could affect bank intermediation and the economy. Under empirically-relevant assumptions (i.e., central bank collateral requirements and imperfect substitutability across CBDC, cash and deposits), the issuance of CBDC yields non-trivial trade-offss and effects through an expansion of the central bank balance sheet and profits. The issuance of CBDC exerts a smoothing effect on lending and real GDP by stabilizing deposit holdings. Such "stabilization effect" improves the well-known liquidity services/disintermediation trade-off induced by CBDC and permits to rank different types of CBDC rules according to individual and social preferences. Welfare-maximizing CBDC policy rules are effective in mitigating the risk of bank disintermediation and induce significant welfare gains.
- JEL Code
- E42 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Monetary Systems, Standards, Regimes, Government and the Monetary System, Payment Systems
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
- 12 May 2022
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 293Details
- Abstract
- In July 2021 the Eurosystem decided to launch the investigation phase of the digital euro project, which aims to provide euro area citizens with access to central bank money in an increasingly digitalised world. While a digital euro could offer a wide range of benefits, it could prompt changes in the demand for bank deposits and services from private financial entities (ECB, 2020a), with knock-on consequences for bank lending and resilience. By inducing bank disintermediation, a central bank digital currency, or CBDC, could in principle alter the transmission of monetary policy and impact financial stability. To prevent this risk, options to moderate CBDC take-up are being discussed widely.In view of the significant degree of uncertainty surrounding the design of a potential digital euro, its demand and the prevailing environment in which it would be introduced, this paper explores a set of analytical exercises that can offer insights into the consequences it could have for bank intermediation in the euro area.Based on assumptions about the degree of substitution between different forms of money in normal times, several take-up scenarios are calculated to illustrate how the potential demand for a digital euro might shape up. The paper then analyses the mechanisms through which commercial banks and the central bank could react to the introduction of a digital euro. Overall, effects on bank intermediation are found to vary across credit institutions in normal times and to be potentially larger in stressed times. Further, a potential digital euro’s capacity to alter system-wide bank run dynamics appears to depend on a few crucial factors, such as CBDC remuneration and usage limits.
- JEL Code
- E42 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Monetary Systems, Standards, Regimes, Government and the Monetary System, Payment Systems
E51 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Money Supply, Credit, Money Multipliers
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
- 22 September 2021
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 281Details
- Abstract
- Climate change is one of the greatest challenges facing humankind this century. If left unchecked, it is likely to result in more frequent and severe climatic events, with the potential to cause substantial disruption to our economies, businesses and livelihoods in the coming decades. Yet the associated risks remain poorly understood, as climate shocks differ from the financial shocks observed during previous crises. This paper describes the ECB’s economy-wide climate stress test, which has been developed to assess the resilience of non-financial corporates (NFCs) and euro area banks to climate risks, under various assumptions in terms of future climate policies. This stress test comprises three main pillars: (i) climate-specific scenarios to project climate and macroeconomic conditions over the next 30 years; (ii) a comprehensive dataset that combines climate and financial information for millions of companies worldwide and approximately 1,600 consolidated euro area banks; (iii) a novel set of climate-specific models to capture the direct and indirect transmission channels of climate risk drivers for firms and banks.
- JEL Code
- C53 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Econometric Modeling→Forecasting and Prediction Methods, Simulation Methods
C55 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Econometric Modeling→Modeling with Large Data Sets?
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G38 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Government Policy and Regulation
Q54 : Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics, Environmental and Ecological Economics→Environmental Economics→Climate, Natural Disasters, Global Warming
- 12 August 2020
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2454Details
- Abstract
- Since the onset of the Global Financial Crisis, the presence of institutional investors in housing markets has steadily increased over time. Real estate funds (REIFs) and other housing investment firms leverage large-scale buy-to-rent investments in real estate assets that enable them to set prices in rental housing markets. A significant fraction of this funding is being provided in the form of non-bank lending (i.e., lending that is not subject to regulatory LTV limits). I develop a quantitative two-sector DSGE model that incorporates the main features of the real estate fund industry in the current context to study the effectiveness of dynamic LTV ratios as a macroprudential tool. Despite the comparatively low fraction of total property and debt held by REIFs, optimized LTV rules limiting the borrowing capacity of such funds are more effective in smoothing property prices, credit and business cycles than those affecting (indebted) households – borrowing limit. This finding is remarkably robust across alternative calibrations (of key parameters) and specifications of the model. The underlying reason behind such an important and unexpectedly robust finding relates to the strong interconnectedness of REIFs with various sectors of the economy.
- JEL Code
- E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
- 1 July 2020
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2433Details
- Abstract
- Recent empirical studies have documented two remarkable patterns shown by euro area banks in the aftermath of the Great Recession: (i) their tendency to boost capital ratios by shrinking assets (contraction of loans supply), and (ii) their reluctance to cut back on dividends (fall in retained earnings). First, I provide evidence of a potential link between these two trends. When shocks hit their profits, banks tend to adjust retained earnings to smooth dividends. This generates bank equity and credit supply volatility. Then I develop a DSGE model that incorporates this mechanism to study the transmission and effects of a novel macroprudential policy rule - that I shall call Dividend Prudential Target (DPT) - aimed at complementing existing capital regulation by tackling this issue. Welfare-maximizing DPTs are effective (more than the CCyB) in smoothing the financial and the business cycle (by means of less volatile retained earnings) and induce significant welfare gains associated to a Basel III-type of capital regulation through various channels.
- JEL Code
- E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E61 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook→Policy Objectives, Policy Designs and Consistency, Policy Coordination
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
G35 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Payout Policy
- 2022
- ESRB Working Paper Series
- 2022
- SUERF Policy Note
- 2022
- SUERF Policy Note
- 2022
- VoxEU article
- 2021
- International Journal of Central Banking
- 2020
- VoxEU article
- 2020
- VoxEU article
- 2019
- SUERF Policy Note