Δεν διατίθεται στα ελληνικά.
Jurian J.A. Hoondert
- 12 August 2022
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2708Details
- Abstract
- This paper investigates the relationship between central bank (reverse) auctions and bill market liquidity. The analysis includes data on the purchases of bills in the auctions by the Dutch Central Bank under the European Central Bank’s Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP). The results indicate that auctions contribute to smooth market functioning. Two findings stand out. First, by purchasing bills using auctions rather than bilaterally, the central bank increases the bid-to-cover ratio at bill issuance, especially in times of stress. Second, bills are offered at larger sizes and lower prices in central bank auctions near primary issuance.
- JEL Code
- E42 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Monetary Systems, Standards, Regimes, Government and the Monetary System, Payment Systems
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G12 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Asset Pricing, Trading Volume, Bond Interest Rates