Niet beschikbaar in het Nederlands
Juliusz Jabłecki
- 3 May 2013
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1542Details
- Abstract
- After the Lehman default, but also during the euro area sovereign debt crisis, central banks have tended to extend the ability of banks to take recourse to central bank credit operations through changes of the collateral framework (e.g. CGFS, 2008 - in consistence with previous narratives, such as Bagehot, 1873). We provide a simple four sector model of the economy in which we illustrate the relevant trade-offs, derive optimal central bank collateral policies, and show why in a financial crisis, in which liquidity shocks become more erratic and the total costs of defaults increase, central banks may want to allow for greater potential recourse of banks to central bank credit. The model also illustrates that the credit riskiness of counterparties and issuers is endogenous to the central bank's credit policies and related risk control framework. Finally, the model allows identifying the circumstances under which the counterintuitive case arises in which a relaxation of the central bank collateral policy may reduce its expected losses.
- JEL Code
- E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G32 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Financing Policy, Financial Risk and Risk Management, Capital and Ownership Structure, Value of Firms, Goodwill
- 6 June 2011
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1350Details
- Abstract
- Containing short-term volatility of the overnight interest rate is normally considered the main objective of central bank standing facilities. This paper develops a simple stochastic model to show how the width of the central bank standing facilities corridor affects banks’ day-to-day liquidity management and the volatility of the overnight rate. It is shown that the wider the corridor, the greater the interbank turnover, the leaner the central bank’s balance sheet (i.e. the lower the average recourse to standing facilities) and the greater short-term interest rate volatility. The obtained relationships are matched with central bank preferences to obtain an optimal corridor width. The model is tested against euro area and Hungarian daily data encompassing the financial crisis that began in 2007.
- JEL Code
- E4 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates
E5 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
- 24 March 2011
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1312Details
- Abstract
- The banking system is modelled in a closed system of financial accounts, whereby the equilibrium volume of bank intermediation between households and corporates reflects structural parameters such as household preferences, comparative cost structures of heterogeneous banks, loan demand of corporates, and the difference between the borrowing rate and the deposit facility rate of the central bank. The model also allows understanding the link between this difference (the width of the central bank standing facilities corridor) and the stance of monetary policy, and how this link changes during a financial crisis. It is shown how the narrowing of the standing facilities corridor can make more accommodating the stance of monetary policy in a financial crisis.
- JEL Code
- E43 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages