Eric Persson
- 10 August 2022
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2705Details
- Abstract
- Parliamentary hearings are a fundamental tool to hold independent central banks accountable. However, it is not clear what type of information central banks provide when they communicate with parliaments compared to other existing information channels. In this article, we address this question by comparing the communication of the European Central Bank (ECB) in parliamentary hearings to its communication in the regular press conferences that follow monetary policy decisions. Using text analysis on the ECB President’s introductory statements in parliamentary hearings and press conferences from 1998 to 2021, we show that the ECB uses parliamentary hearings to discuss topics that are less covered in press conferences. We also find that the ECB’s policy stance in the hearings tends to reflect the stance in press conferences, and that the degree of language complexity is similar in the two fora. These findings support the view that the ECB mainly uses parliamentary hearings to further explain policy decisions first presented at press conferences but also to put them in a broader context.
- JEL Code
- E02 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→General→Institutions and the Macroeconomy
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
- 14 March 2022
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2655Details
- Abstract
- We investigate whether ideology drives the sentiments of parliamentarians when they speak to the central bank they hold accountable. To this end, we collect textual data on the quarterly hearings of the ECB President before the European Parliament from 1999 to 2019. We apply sentiment analysis to more than 1,900 speeches of individual Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) from 128 parties. We find robust evidence that MEPs’ sentiments toward the ECB are correlated with the ideological stance predominantly on a pro-/anti-European dimension rather than on a left-right dimension.
- JEL Code
- E02 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→General→Institutions and the Macroeconomy
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
- 15 June 2020
- ECONOMIC BULLETIN - ARTICLEEconomic Bulletin Issue 4, 2020Details
- Abstract
- Building on the literature on trust in institutions, this article looks at the state, evolution and sociodemographic breakdown of citizens’ trust in the ECB and support for the euro. Drawing on a novel typology of attitudes towards Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and using microdata from Eurobarometer surveys since the introduction of the single currency, the analysis tracks the prevalence of supporters and sceptics of EMU over time and across euro area countries. It further explores the sociodemographic characteristics, economic perceptions and, more broadly, European sentiments within these groups. In this way, it provides insights into the factors shaping citizens’ attitudes towards the ECB, the euro and EMU, and helps identify possible avenues for enhancing trust. The analysis indicates that popular support for EMU – in particular, trust in the ECB – hinges to a large extent on citizens’ perceptions of their personal situation and the overall economic context, as well as their broader attitudes towards the European Union, while other sociodemographic indicators seem to be less relevant.
- JEL Code
- E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G53 : Financial Economics
R10 : Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics→General Regional Economics→General
Z13 : Other Special Topics→Cultural Economics, Economic Sociology, Economic Anthropology→Economic Sociology, Economic Anthropology, Social and Economic Stratification
- 21 June 2017
- DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES - No. 3Details
- Abstract
- Monetary policy communication is particularly important during unconventional times, because high uncertainty about the economy, the introduction of new policy tools and possible limits to the central bank’s toolkit could hamper the predictability of policy actions. We study how monetary policy communication should and has worked under such circumstances. Our main results relate to announcements of asset purchase programmes and the use of forward guidance. We show that announcements of asset purchase programmes have lowered market uncertainty, particularly when accompanied by a contextual release of implementation details such as the envisaged size of the programme. We also show that forward guidance reduces uncertainty more effectively when it is state‐contingent or when it provides guidance about a long horizon than when it is open‐ended or covers only a short horizon, and that the credibility of forward guidance is strengthened if the central bank also has embarked on an asset purchase programme.
- JEL Code
- E43 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
- 21 June 2017
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2080Details
- Abstract
- Monetary policy communication is particularly important during unconventional times because high uncertainty about the economy, the introduction of new policy tools and possible limits to the central bank’s toolkit could hamper the predictability of policy actions. We study how monetary policy communication should and has worked under such circumstances. Our main results relate to announcements of asset purchase programmes and the use of forward guidance. We show that announcements of asset purchase programmes have lowered market uncertainty, particularly when accompanied by a contextual release of implementation details such as the envisaged size of the programme. We also show that forward guidance reduces uncertainty more effectively when it is state‐contingent or when it provides guidance about a long horizon than when it is open‐ended or covers only a short horizon, and that the credibility of forward guidance is strengthened if the central bank also has embarked on an asset purchase programme.
- JEL Code
- E43 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies - Network
- Discussion papers