Nėra lietuvių kalba
Cosimo Pancaro
- 13 September 2024
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2980Details
- Abstract
- By applying a structural demand model to unique consumer-level survey data from the euro area, we assess how different CBDC design options, combined with individual (revealed) preferences, influence the potential demand for a digital euro. Estimating the demand for a digital euro, we find that if it were unconstrained, it could range, in steady state, between 3-28% of household liquid assets or €0.12 - €1.11 trillion, depending on whether consumers would perceive the digital euro to be more cash-like or deposit-like. With an illustrative €3,000 holding limit per person, it could instead range between 2-9% or €0.10 -€0.38 trillion. Privacy, automatic funding, and instant settlement raise its potential demand.
- JEL Code
- E41 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Demand for Money
E50 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→General
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
- 9 July 2024
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2950Details
- Abstract
- We match granular supervisory and credit register data to assess the implications of banks’ exposure to interest rate risk on the monetary policy transmission to bank lending supply in the euro area. We exploit the largest and swiftest increase in interest rates since the creation of the euro and find that banks with a higher exposure to interest rate risk, i.e., with a larger duration gap after accounting for hedging, curtailed corporate lending more than their peers. Ceteris paribus, greater interest rate risk entails closer supervisory scrutiny and potential capital surcharges in the short term, and lower expected profitability and capital accumulation in the medium to long term. We then proceed to dissect banks’ credit allocation and find that banks with higher net duration reshuffled their loan portfolio away from long-term loans in an attempt to limit the increase in interest rate risk and targetedtheir lending contraction to small and micro firms. Firms exposed to banks with a larger exposure to interest rate risk were unable to fully rebalance their borrowing needs with other lenders, thus experiencing a relatively larger decrease in total borrowing during the monetary tightening episode.
- JEL Code
- E51 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Money Supply, Credit, Money Multipliers
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
- 14 May 2024
- FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW - ARTICLEFinancial Stability Review Issue 1, 2024Details
- Abstract
- Geopolitical risk can be a threat to financial stability and the global economy. It can adversely affect the economy and financial markets and consequently have a negative impact on the funding, lending, solvency, asset quality and profitability of banks and non-banks alike. Recent history suggests that adverse geopolitical events alone are unlikely to cause a systemic crisis, although they may act as a trigger for systemic distress if they interact with pre-existing vulnerabilities. Looking ahead, policy authorities need to monitor geopolitical risk and assess its possible consequences for financial stability. Financial institutions should apply a combination of sound risk management and business diversification to address geopolitical risk.
- JEL Code
- G1 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
- 18 April 2024
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 346Details
- Abstract
- A digital euro would provide the general public with an additional means of payment in the form of risk-free central bank money in digital form that is universally accepted for digital payments across the euro area. A digital euro would offer a wide range of financial stability benefits, including safeguarding the role of public money and strengthening the strategic autonomy and monetary sovereignty of the euro area in the digital era. It would be designed to have no material impact on financial stability or the transmission of monetary policy. This paper shows the usefulness of digital euro safeguards, such as holding limits, that would limit the impact of the introduction of a digital euro on banks’ liquidity and on their reliance on central bank funding. To this end, it assesses how banks might respond to the introduction of a digital euro while seeking to maximise profitability and manage their risks for a range of holding limit scenarios. The results of the simulated impact on key liquidity metrics show that, with safeguards in place and on aggregate, the liquidity metrics of euro area banks would decline but remain well above regulatory minimums. In addition, the central bank funding ratios of euro area banks would not increase materially on aggregate and would remain contained overall.
- JEL Code
- E42 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Monetary Systems, Standards, Regimes, Government and the Monetary System, Payment Systems
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
- 22 November 2023
- FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW - ARTICLEFinancial Stability Review Issue 2, 2023Details
- Abstract
- This special feature builds on the concept of maturity gap as a metric of banks’ maturity mismatch to shed light on how banks’ engagement in maturity transformation differs across euro area countries and bank types. Banks can mitigate the interest rate risk stemming from their maturity mismatch by using derivatives for hedging purposes. Euro area banks increased their positions in interest rate derivatives over the last two years in anticipation of the start of monetary policy normalisation. Significant institutions rely more than cooperative and savings banks on interest rate derivatives and have a more diversified positioning. A box within the special feature finds that this greater reliance on derivatives was not sufficient to compensate for the material increase in interest rate risk. The extent of banks’ maturity mismatch determines the sensitivity of their net interest income to changes in interest rates and the slope of the yield curve. This special feature provides empirical evidence that the more banks engage in maturity transformation, the more their net interest margin benefits from a steepening of the yield curve, boosting bank profits. This effect might dissipate going forward, especially for banks in countries where variable-rate lending predominates.
- JEL Code
- G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G32 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Financing Policy, Financial Risk and Risk Management, Capital and Ownership Structure, Value of Firms, Goodwill
- 22 November 2023
- FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW - BOXFinancial Stability Review Issue 2, 2023Details
- Abstract
- Central banks around the world have stepped up their efforts to explore and develop their own digital currencies (known as CBDCs), an electronic equivalent to cash. In the euro area, the introduction of a CBDC (“digital euro”) could offer several financial stability benefits by providing an alternative to new forms of private digital money and spurring innovation. At the same time, a CBDC, if not properly designed, could prompt financial stability risks and affect the structure and scale of bank intermediation. In the absence of effective safeguards, such as caps on individual holdings, the materialisation of high deposit outflows could heighten liquidity risk for significant institutions. However, the envisaged design of a digital euro would address such financial stability concerns by applying adequate caps on individual holdings.
- JEL Code
- E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
- 20 November 2023
- FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW - BOXFinancial Stability Review Issue 2, 2023Details
- Abstract
- Euro area bank earnings have reached multi-year highs, while bank equity valuations have not substantially exceeded pre-pandemic levels. Banks’ exposure to corporate credit risk and the perception of their stocks as value stocks have contributed to the stagnant valuations. However, valuations cannot be fully explained by fundamentals and may be due to heightened uncertainty about shareholder access to returns earned by banks. Overall, this increases the cost of lending to the real economy and makes it harder for banks to raise capital.
- JEL Code
- G12 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Asset Pricing, Trading Volume, Bond Interest Rates
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G32 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Financing Policy, Financial Risk and Risk Management, Capital and Ownership Structure, Value of Firms, Goodwill
G35 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Payout Policy
- 31 May 2023
- FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW - BOXFinancial Stability Review Issue 1, 2023Details
- Abstract
- This box investigates recent changes in the cost and the composition of bank deposits. It provides estimates of the sensitivity of banks’ deposit rates to changes in policy rates, demonstrating that this depends on the type of deposit and on bank-specific characteristics. Moreover, it finds that competition in the term deposit market has been increasing recently. It goes on to show that, since the beginning of 2022, higher interest rates have increased non-financial corporations’ appetite for better remunerated deposit types, shifting banks’ deposit mixes away from stickier overnight deposits towards rate-sensitive term deposits. Finally, it hints that, going forward, rising competition and a reallocation of funds from overnight to term deposits may lead to an increase in the cost of deposits that is faster and larger than expected.
- JEL Code
- E5 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
- 30 May 2023
- FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW - ARTICLEFinancial Stability Review Issue 1, 2023Details
- Abstract
- Banks are connected to non-bank financial intermediation (NBFI) sector entities via loans, securities and derivatives exposures, as well as funding dependencies. Linkages with the NBFI sector expose banks to liquidity, market and credit risks. Funding from NBFI entities would appear to be the most likely and strongest spillover channel, considering that NBFI entities maintain their liquidity buffers primarily as deposits and very short-term repo transactions with banks. At the same time, direct credit exposures are smaller and are often related to NBFI entities associated with banking groups. Links with NBFI entities are highly concentrated in a small group of systemically important banks, whose sizeable capital and liquidity buffers are essential to mitigate spillover risks.
- JEL Code
- G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G22 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Insurance, Insurance Companies, Actuarial Studies
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
- 16 May 2023
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2818Details
- Abstract
- Can banks trade credit default swaps (CDSs) referenced on their current corporate clients at competitive prices, or are banks penalized for potentially holding private information? To answer this question we merge CDS trades reported under the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) with syndicated loans from DealScan, and compare the prices on similar CDSs that the same dealer offers to banks and to other investors. We find that banks lending to a corporation purchase CDSs on this corporation at lower prices, and that, after trading with banks, dealers can earn higher margins on these CDSs when trading with other investors. Our findings suggest that banks hold valuable private information which is shared in their trades with dealers. Dealers then disseminate this information to financial markets.
- JEL Code
- G14 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Information and Market Efficiency, Event Studies, Insider Trading
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
- 23 February 2023
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2790Details
- Abstract
- This paper investigates to what extent the introduction of negative monetary policy rates altered competitive behaviour in the euro area banking sector. Specifically, it analyses the effect that negative policy rates had on euro area banks’ market power in comparison to banks that have not been subject to negative rates. The analysis, considering a sample of 4,223 banks over the period 2011–2018 and relying on a difference-in-differences methodology, finds that negative monetary policy rates led to an increase in euro area banks’ market power. Furthermore, it shows that, during the negative interest rate policy period, change in banks’ competitive behaviour affected the bank lending channel and discouraged banks from taking excessive risks.
- JEL Code
- E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G20 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→General
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
- 16 November 2022
- FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW - BOXFinancial Stability Review Issue 2, 2022Details
- Abstract
- Interest rate swaps account for the largest share of the euro area derivatives market. Outstanding contracts on EURIBOR swaps have risen sharply since 2021, possibly reflecting expectations of monetary policy normalisation. Using trade repository data on individual EURIBOR swap trades between 2019 and 2022, this box identifies how the risk is being shared across sectors in the interest rate swaps market and who would pay margins to whom should rates change. Empirical findings show that euro area banks are among the most active counterparties in EURIBOR swaps, due to either their role as market-makers or their need to hedge interest rate risk. Investment funds, insurance companies and pension funds would need to make margin payments in the event of rising interest rates.
- JEL Code
- G12 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Asset Pricing, Trading Volume, Bond Interest Rates
G13 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Contingent Pricing, Futures Pricing
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G22 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Insurance, Insurance Companies, Actuarial Studies
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
G24 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Investment Banking, Venture Capital, Brokerage, Ratings and Ratings Agencies
E43 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
- 9 September 2022
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2718Details
- Abstract
- Do negative interest rates affect banks’ cost efficiency? We exploit the unprecedented introduction of negative policy interest rates in the euro area to investigate whether banks make a virtue out of necessity in reacting to negative interest rates by adjusting their cost efficiency. We find that banks most affected by negative interest rates responded by enhancing their cost efficiency. We also show that improvements in cost efficiency are more pronounced for banks that are larger, less profitable, with lower asset quality and that operate in more competitive banking sectors. In addition, we document that enhancements in cost efficiency are statistically significant only when breaching the zero lower bound (ZLB), indicating that the pass-through of interest rates to cost efficiency is not effective when policy rates are positive. These findings hold important policy implications as they provide evidence on a beneficial second-order effect of negative interest rates on bank efficiency.
- JEL Code
- E43 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
F34 : International Economics→International Finance→International Lending and Debt Problems
- 13 June 2022
- MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 17Details
- Abstract
- The publication of stress test results improves transparency and market discipline. It promotes financial stability by generating new information, thus improving the ability of markets to discriminate between banks. The results of this analysis confirm the certification role of stress tests.
- JEL Code
- G11 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Portfolio Choice, Investment Decisions
G14 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Information and Market Efficiency, Event Studies, Insider Trading
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
- 25 May 2022
- FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW - BOXFinancial Stability Review Issue 1, 2022Details
- Abstract
- Relying on an economic value approach and exploiting granular supervisory data on euro area banks, this box finds that the aggregate impact of higher interest rates on bank net worth would be moderately negative, but wide variations exist at the level of individual banks. Over time, derivatives have played an offsetting role, allowing banks to reduce their interest rate risk exposures arising from on- and off-balance-sheet positioning. In line with the expectation of higher interest rates, empirical evidence from EMIR data shows that banks have increased the volume of longer-dated interest rate swaps on which they receive floating rates, mainly trading these contracts with insurance companies and pension funds.
- JEL Code
- G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G12 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Asset Pricing, Trading Volume, Bond Interest Rates
- 19 May 2021
- FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW - BOXFinancial Stability Review Issue 1, 2021Details
- Abstract
- This box sheds light on how the structure of cross-sectoral credit risk transmission has evolved since the start of the pandemic. It does so by using high-frequency, firm-level data on expected default frequencies to estimate the direction and intensity of credit risk spillovers between the sovereign, bank, non-bank financial and corporate sectors. It shows that the credit risk interdependency of euro area financials and corporates with sovereigns has increased markedly in the wake of the pandemic strengthening the sovereign-bank-corporate nexus. It finds that risk transmission from the corporate sector to sovereigns increased substantially and remained elevated between March and October 2020. It also shows that risk transmission from sovereigns to other sectors spiked immediately after the pandemic but was relatively more contained and short-lived thanks to the ECB policy action.
- JEL Code
- C32 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models, Multiple Variables→Time-Series Models, Dynamic Quantile Regressions, Dynamic Treatment Effect Models, Diffusion Processes
F3 : International Economics→International Finance
G15 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→International Financial Markets
- 14 May 2021
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2551Details
- Abstract
- Using a difference-in-differences approach and relying on confidential supervisory data and an unique proprietary data set available at the European Central Bank related to the 2016 EU-wide stress test, this paper presents novel empirical evidence that supervisory scrutiny associated to stress testing has a disciplining effect on bank risk. We find that banks that participated in the 2016 EU-wide stress test subsequently reduced their credit risk relative to banks that were not part of this exercise. Relying on new metrics for supervisory scrutiny that measure the quantity, potential impact, and duration of interactions between banks and supervisors during the stress test, we find that the disciplining effect is stronger for banks subject to more intrusive supervisory scrutiny during the exercise.
- JEL Code
- G11 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Portfolio Choice, Investment Decisions
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
- 23 November 2020
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2491Details
- Abstract
- The assets under management of investment funds have soared in recent years, triggering a debate on their possible implications for financial stability. We contribute to this debate assessing the asset price impact of fire sales in a novel partial equilibrium model of euro area funds and banks calibrated over the period between 2008 and 2017. An initial shock to yields causes funds to sell assets to address investor redemptions, while both banks and funds sell assets to keep their leverage constant. These fire sales generate second-round price effects. We find that the potential losses due to the price impact of fire sales have decreased over time for the system. The contribution of funds to this impact is lower than that of banks. However, funds’ relative contribution has risen due to their increased assets under management and banks’ lower leverage and rebalancing towards loans. Should this trend continue, funds will become an increasingly important source of systemic risk.
- JEL Code
- G1 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
- 15 May 2020
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2411Details
- Abstract
- We contribute to the empirical literature on the impact of non-performing loan (NPL) ratios on aggregate banking sector variables and the macroeconomy by estimating a panel Bayesian VAR model for twelve euro area countries. The model is estimated assuming a hierarchical prior that allows for country-specific coefficients. The VAR includes a large set of variables and is identified via Choleski factorisation. We estimate the impact of exogenous shocks to the change in NPL ratios across countries. The main findings of the paper are as follows: i ) An impulse response analysis shows that an exogenous increase in the change in NPL ratios tends to depress bank lending volumes, widens bank lending spreads and leads to a fall in real GDP growth and residential real estate prices; ii ) A forecast error variance decomposition shows that shocks to the change in NPL ratios explain a relatively large share of the variance of the variables in the VAR, particularly for countries that experienced a large increase in NPL ratios during the recent crises; and iii ) A three-year structural out-of-sample scenario analysis provides quantitative evidence that reducing banks' NPL ratios can produce significant benefits in euro area countries in terms of improved macroeconomic and financial conditions.
- JEL Code
- G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
C32 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models, Multiple Variables→Time-Series Models, Dynamic Quantile Regressions, Dynamic Treatment Effect Models, Diffusion Processes
C11 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General→Bayesian Analysis: General
- 8 January 2020
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2356Details
- Abstract
- This paper investigates the relationship between bank funding costs and solvency for a large sample of euro area banks using two proprietary ECB datasets for both wholesale funding costs and deposit rates. In particular, the paper studies the relationship between bank solvency, on the one hand, and senior bond yields, term deposit rates and overnight deposit rates, on the other. The analysis finds a significant negative relationship between bank solvency and the different types of funding costs. It also shows that this relationship is non-linear, namely convex, for senior bond yields and term deposit rates. It also identifies a positive realistic solvency threshold beyond which the effect of an increase in solvency on senior bond yields becomes positive. The paper also finds that senior bond yields are more sensitive to a change in solvency than deposit rates. Among the deposit rates, the interest rates of the overnight deposits are the least sensitive. Banks' asset quality, profitability and liquidity seem to play only a minor role in driving funding costs while the ECB monetary policy stance, sovereign risk and financial markets uncertainty appear to be material drivers.
- JEL Code
- G15 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→International Financial Markets
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
- 29 October 2019
- MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 9Details
- Abstract
- This article aims to contribute to the ongoing discussion about the long-term strategy for stress testing in the euro area. In particular, it highlights some of the strengths and weaknesses of the constrained bottom-up approach, which is currently used in the EU‑wide stress-testing exercise. Under this approach, banks use their own models to generate stress test projections on the basis of a common macroeconomic scenario and under the constraints imposed by the European Banking Authority methodology. This set-up provides banks with some scope to underestimate their vulnerabilities in order to appear more resilient than their peers. This article confirms previous empirical evidence showing that such behaviour may indeed be practised by banks. This, in turn, requires a robust quality assurance of banks’ stress test projections by the competent authorities (including the European Central Bank), to enforce more realistic results. Against this background, the article presents a novel empirical analysis providing indicative evidence that the “supervisory scrutiny” relating to the quality assurance may be having a disciplining effect on banks’ risk-taking.
- JEL Code
- G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
- 2 July 2019
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 226Details
- Abstract
- This paper presents an approach to a macroprudential stress test for the euro area banking system, comprising the 91 largest euro area credit institutions across 19 countries. The approach involves modelling banks’ reactions to changing economic conditions. It also examines the effects of adverse scenarios on economies and the financial system as a whole by acknowledging a broad set of interactions and interdependencies between banks, other market participants, and the real economy. Our results highlight the importance of the starting level of bank capital, bank asset quality, and banks’ adjustments for the propagation of shocks to the financial sector and real economy.
- JEL Code
- E37 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
- 27 February 2017
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2029Details
- Abstract
- This paper uses panel econometric techniques to estimate a macro- nancial model for fee and commission income over total assets for a broad sample of euro area banks. Using the estimated parameters, it conducts a scenario analysis projecting the fee and commission income ratio over a three years horizon conditional on the baseline and adverse macro-economic scenarios used in the 2016 EU-wide stress test.The results indicate that the fee and commission income ratio is varying in particular with changes in its own lag, the short-term interest rate, stock market returns and real GDP growth. They also show that the fee and commission income ratio projections are more conservative under the adverse scenario than under the baseline scenario. These findings suggest that stress tests assuming scenario-independent fee and commission income projections are likely to be flawed.
- JEL Code
- G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G17 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Financial Forecasting and Simulation
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
- 27 February 2017
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2028Details
- Abstract
- In this paper, we develop an analytical framework for conducting forward-looking assessments of profitability and solvency of the main euro area insurance sectors. We model the balance sheet of an insurance company encompassing both life and non-life business and we calibrate it using country level data to make it representative of the major euro area insurance markets. Then, we project this representative balance sheet forward under stochastic capital markets, stochastic mortality developments and stochastic claims. The model highlights the potential threats to insurers solvency and profitability stemming from a sustained period of low interest rates particularly in those markets which are largely exposed to reinvestment risks due to the relatively high guarantees and generous profit participation schemes. The model also proves how the resilience of insurers to adverse financial developments heavily depends on the diversification of their business mix. Finally, the model identifies potential negative spillovers between life and non-life business through the redistribution of capital within groups.
- JEL Code
- G22 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Insurance, Insurance Companies, Actuarial Studies
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
G20 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→General
- 24 November 2016
- FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW - ARTICLEFinancial Stability Review Issue 2, 2016Details
- Abstract
- The euro area banking sector is faced with cyclical and structural challenges, which are hampering many banks’ ability to generate sustainable profits. In particular, the prolonged period of low nominal growth and low yields compresses net interest income, which traditionally has been (and still is) euro area banks’ main source of income. One way for banks to compensate for compressed net interest margins could be to adapt their business models, moving towards more fee and commission-generating activities. This article discusses the challenges involved in boosting fee and commission income and highlights some of the potential financial stability implications related to a greater reliance on these income sources.
- JEL Code
- G00 : Financial Economics→General→General
- 25 November 2015
- FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW - ARTICLEFinancial Stability Review Issue 2, 2015Details
- Abstract
- The current environment of protracted low interest rates poses major challenges to euro area insurance companies. This special feature discusses how a prolonged low-yield period might affect the profitability and the solvency of euro area insurers. In the article, it is argued that if interest rates were to stay low for a long time, this could have material implications for the profitability and the solvency of many insurers. However, it is also shown that the impact of low interest rates is likely to differ markedly across insurance companies depending on their business model and balance sheet structure. In particular, the impact is expected to be highest for small and medium-sized life insurers with large government bond portfolios and high guarantees to policyholders that reside in countries where these guarantees are rigid and where contracts embed a long time to maturity.
- JEL Code
- G00 : Financial Economics→General→General
- 28 May 2015
- FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW - ARTICLEFinancial Stability Review Issue 1, 2015Details
- Abstract
- Weak profitability among euro area banks is one key risk to financial stability. This special feature examines the main drivers influencing banks’ profitability, including bank-specific, macroeconomic and structural factors. The empirical part of the special feature finds that challenges appear to be mainly of a cyclical nature, although there may also be material structural impediments to reigniting bank profitability.
- JEL Code
- G00 : Financial Economics→General→General
- 11 October 2013
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 152Details
- Abstract
- The use of macro stress tests to assess bank solvency has developed rapidly over the past few years. This development was reinforced by the financial crisis, which resulted in substantial losses for banks and created general uncertainty about the banking sector's loss-bearing capacity. Macro stress testing has proved a useful instrument to help identify potential vulnerabilities within the banking sector and to gauge its resilience to adverse developments. To support its contribution to safeguarding financial stability and its financial sector-related work in the context of EU/IMF Financial Assistance Programmes, and looking ahead to the establishment of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), the ECB has developed a top-down macro stress testing framework that is used regularly for forward-looking bank solvency assessments. This paper comprehensively presents the main features of this framework and illustrates how it can be employed for various policy analysis purposes.
- JEL Code
- C53 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Econometric Modeling→Forecasting and Prediction Methods, Simulation Methods
D85 : Microeconomics→Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty→Network Formation and Analysis: Theory
E37 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E47 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
- 13 May 2013
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1547Details
- Abstract
- This paper studies current account reversals in industrial countries across different exchange rate regimes. There are two major findings which have important implications for industrial economies with external imbalances: first, triggers of current account reversals differ between exchange rate regimes. While the current account deficit and the output gap are significant predictors of reversals across all regimes, reserve coverage, credit booms, openness to trade and the US short term interest rate determine the likelihood of reversals only under more rigid regimes. Conversely, the real exchange rate affects the probability of experiencing a reversal only under flexible arrangements. Second, current account reversals in advanced economies do not have an independent effect on growth. This result holds not only for industrial economies in general but also for countries with fixed exchange rate regimes in particular.
- JEL Code
- F32 : International Economics→International Finance→Current Account Adjustment, Short-Term Capital Movements
F41 : International Economics→Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance→Open Economy Macroeconomics
- 12 November 2012
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1491Details
- Abstract
- This paper addresses the mechanisms by which trade openness affects growth volatility. Using a diverse set of export concentration measures, we present strong evidence pointing to an important role for export diversification in conditioning the effect of trade openness on growth volatility. Indeed, the effect of openness on volatility is shown to be negative for a significant proportion of countries with relatively diversified export baskets.
- JEL Code
- F15 : International Economics→Trade→Economic Integration
F43 : International Economics→Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance→Economic Growth of Open Economies
O24 : Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth→Development Planning and Policy→Trade Policy, Factor Movement Policy, Foreign Exchange Policy