# The response of households to credit supply shocks

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## <u>Goal</u>

The goal of this paper is to study whether and to what extent the bank lending channel produces real consequences for households

 following the global financial crisis of 2007-08 there has been considerable attention to the consequences of bank shocks for real outcomes of non-financial firms; much fewer papers have assessed how the crisis affected households



Our analysis is divided into two steps

 we complement this small pool of studies by looking at how Italian households responded to a negative credit supply shock by adjusting their borrowing, expenditures, financial portfolios and labour supply

# **Identification**

#### Exogenous shock

 we use the global financial crisis, the consequent dry-up of the interbank market and Italy as a laboratory for our analysis
following a relevant literature (limited to firms), we measure each bank exposure to the imminent financial crisis as the weight of interbank funding for each bank in the period preceding the shock

Disentangle demand and supply effects

❑ including the complete set of province fixed effects. Provinces are Italian administrative "counties", that is, administrative divisions of intermediate level that represent an ideal set to take into account demand differences, as Italian provinces are very heterogeneous in terms of economic and financial structure and development, as well as in terms of household and banking characteristics 1) we investigate whether and to what extent funding shocks to banks affect lending to households

2) we investigate whether and how these changes in lending supply translate into changes in household real outcomes

... and in two levels of analysis

a) analysis at bank-province level

supervisory data refer to all banks operating in Italy and virtually to all indebted households of Italy

#### b) analysis at household-bank level

data of Bank of Italy's Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) allow to match household detailed information with the identity of the primary bank of each household

### **Preliminary results**

accounting for a very large set of confounding pre-crisis individual characteristics, both on household and bank side

analysing pre-crisis observable characteristics of households in more and less exposed banks

showing that pre-crisis trends in outcomes are parallel across households

#### b) Household-bank level analysis

 $\Delta_{2010-2008}(debt - to - income)_{h,b} = \beta interbank exposure_{b,2006} + \gamma H_{h,2008} + \lambda B_{b,2006} + \phi_p + \varepsilon_{h,b}$ 

where  $\Delta(debt - to - income)_{h,b}$  is the change between 2008 and 2010 of financial debts of household h, customer of bank b. The vectors  $H_{h,2008}$  and  $B_{b,2006}$  are vectors of characteristics, respectively, of household h and bank b measured in the pre-shock period. Each household h is

#### a) Bank-province level analysis

 $v_{gtp} = \alpha IS_g + \beta T_t + \gamma P_p + \delta G_g$ 

where  $v_{gtp}$  is the percentage variation in loans to households over the period,  $IS_g$  is the interbank exposure of bank,  $T_t$  and  $P_p$  are loan type and province fixed effects, and  $G_g$  is a set of banking group controls.

		Dependent variable:					
	Percentage variation in household loans						
	2007-2006	2008-2006	2009-2006	2010-2006			
Interbank share	-0.655***	-0.560**	-0.834***	-2.012***			
	(0.113)	(0.223)	(0.300)	(0.540)			
Control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes			
Observations	5 577	5 522	5 500	5 577			
R <sup>2</sup>	5,522 0.123	5,522 0,147	5,522 0,189	5,522 0.197			
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.104	0.129	0.172	0.180			
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes			

#### resident in a province p; the vector $\phi_p$ is a vector of all province fixed effects.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Interbank share in 2006	-0.342**	-0.291**	-0.374***	-0.467***
	(0.168)	(0.132)	(0.138)	(0.168)
HH debt in 2008 (Log of)		-0.009***	-0.009***	-0.009***
		(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
HH income in 2008 (Log of)		0.008**	0.003	0.003
		(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)
HH control variables	No	No	Yes	Yes
Bank control variables	No	No	No	Yes

HH sector of activity	No	No	Yes	Yes
Province fixed effects	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	3298	3298	3298	3298
$R^2$	0.002	0.193	0.236	0.239
Adjusted-R <sup>2</sup>	0.001	0.192	0.206	0.207



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